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K. ROGER BEAN 
50 North Main Street 
Layton, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent. 
LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHAYS 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake ·City, Utah 
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IN THE SUP·REME COURT 
OF T'HE STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABETH JENSEN, 
IJlal~ntiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
HEBER JOHN ''THITESID,ES and 
EFFIE WHITESIDES, husband and 
\\~ife, 
Defendants a·nd Appellants. 
Case 
No. 9581 
STATE~1ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Respondent sued appellant in the District Court for 
Salt Lake County claiming unjust enrichment, and p·ray-
ing for restitution of $3,000.00 plus the amount of certain 
small bills paid by plaintiff, less the reasonable rental 
value of certain premises for the time they were occupied 
by plaintiff, together ,v·ith interest and court costs. 
A jury found in plaintiff's favor, a'varded a verdict 
of $1,000.00, and judgment thereon "Tas entered. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek reversal or a ne'v trial. 
S'TATEMENT OF FACT·S 
Defendants' statement of facts is argumentative, 
largely irrelevant, and stated most favorably for de-
fendants. For a view of the facts stated favorably in sup-
port of the verdict (Jolvnson Readi-Mix Concrete Com-
pany v. United Pacific Insurance Company, (Utah 1961) 
358 P.2d 337; Hogan Dairy Company v. Creamery Pack-
age Manufacturing Company, (Utah 1961) 358 P.2d 906) 
plaintiff submits the following: 
In September 1957, at Port Angeles in the State of 
Washington, plaintiff and defendants agreed verbally 
that defendants would build a small frame home for 
plaintiff and her husband near Layton, Utah (T. 4). 
Plaintiff and her husband ''Tere to have possession and 
own the ·house, and were to pay defendants the sum of 
$3,000.00 for it (T. 17, 42, 43). 
Plaintiff paid the $3,000.00 to defendants and defend-
ants proceeded to construct a log cabin type home on land 
which they either owned or controlled near Layton, l""tah. 
The home cost approximately $9,000.00 to build. Plaintiff 
moved into the house in January, 1958, and moved out 
in t·he forep·art of December, 1959. Between those dates, 
the friendly relationship 'vhich had theretofore existed 
bet,veen the purties deteriorated. At one time in the 
22 month period referred to above, plaintiff asked defend-
ant Jack Whitesides for some evidence of her ownership 
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of the home or at least an equity in it, and he refused to 
deliver it. After defendants' refusal eithe.r to convey an 
equity in the home to plaintiff or to repay to her the 
$3,000.00, less reasonable rental value, plaintiff com-
menced this action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY VERDICT. 
The general rule, heretofore announced by this court 
and uniformly supported by all the authorities, is that 
the verdict of a jury will be sustained on ap·peal if there 
is any e.vidence in the record supporting it, either directly 
and immediately or by fair inference. Porter v. Price, 
11 Utah 2d 80, 355 P.2d 66 (1960); Cottrell v. Grand 
Union Tea Company, 5 Utah 2d 187, 299 P.2d 622, 626 
(1956); 3 Am. Jur., Appeal and Er-ror, §952 (1936). 
Defendants have, in their brief, cited sufficient evi-
dence to support the verdict. Because of its pertinenee, 
material portions are here set forth again (T. 42-43) : 
''THE COURT: Mr. Summerhays, I am at 
a loss to kno":r just 'vhat the understanding was. 
What does she claim~ If you will ask her some 
questions along that line about this understanding. 
Q. I "\Yill do that, your Honor. Of course I 
have been looking at my own case to find out 'vhat 
it wasn't. I will ask her what it was. vVhat was 
your understanding, l\Irs. Jensen, with respect 
to what was to happen to the property and this 
$3,000.00 that was advanced~ 
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d . 0! A. Well, \Yhat was my understan mg · 
Q. Yes~ 
THE COURT : Not her understanding. 
Q. W·ell what -
THE ·COURT: The understanding. 
Q. What was the understanding:! 
A. Well my understanding, or the under-
standing was that he \vas going to build us a little 
house, a small house for $3,000.00 and give us 
the house. \V e \Yere to have possession and o\vn 
the house. Now that \vas the idea." 
Defendant Jack \rhitesides testified to the same agree-
ment (T. -±) : 
4 
'Q. Now \Yhat \vas the purpose of this 
$3,000.00 payment ? 
A. The purpose of the $3,000.00 was due to 
the fact that she \vas getting aged. She and her 
husband, they wanted a ho1ne to "~here \Ye could 
help take care of then1. They wanted us to build 
them a little home do\vn in the hollo\v, \Yhat \Ye 
call it, or the big ravine \vhere \Ye haYe a little 
home that we live in in the su1nn1er, and she says-
you could build either out here by the silo or down 
here in the bushes by the creek. And so \ve talked 
about it many tin1es. 
Q. Did you eventually build that home for 
her~ 
A. Yes. We did build a ho1ne-' ~ 
The defendants clai1ned, and tried to prove, that ~Irs. 
Jensen didn't expect to receiYe any O\vnership of a 
home for her $3,000.00, but the jury found against them 
and the verdict again is amply supported by the evidence. 
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For exa1nple, the follo,ving testimony of the plaintiff 
(T. 24): 
~'Q. vV as the house insured~ 
A. Yes. The house \vas insured and I found 
that out accidently. 
Q. Were you ever named as an assured on 
any policy~ 
A. No. There was nothing to show that I had 
any equity in the house at all. And I found this 
insurance policy on the table, looked at it, and the 
next time I saw Mr. Whitesides I said - Jack, 
I said, you insured the house. And ·he said - yes. 
And I said - well, I said, there is nothing to show 
that I have any equity in it and I said usually an 
insurance policy is written in the name of the two 
people who have an equity in it. And I said in the 
second person it is as their interest may appear. 
Oh, he says, I'll insure it under a blanket policy. 
He said its not going to burn down. Well he had 
a fire before that, before I ever moved into it-" 
And further at T. 40: 
"'Q. vVas it your intention that you pay the 
taxes~ 
A. I had never thought of taxes because for 
the simple reason that I had absolutely nothing 
to show-1\fr. Whitesides never gave me one thing 
in writing to show that I had any equity in that 
house.'' 
And the following testimony from the d·efendant Jack 
Whitesides (T. 100): 
'' Q. Now you knew l\Irs. Jensen expected to 
get something for her $3000.00 ~ 
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A. Oh, yes. 
Q. And you lmew that at the time~ 
A. Yes.'' 
Defendants devote considerable argument to the 
proposition that they never expressly promised plaintiff 
a deed to any property. They concede, at page 14 of their 
brief, that the inference that a deed would be given might 
necessarily arise from the "surrounding circumstances 
of the parties," but contend that such circumstances 
did not exist here. Defendants then cite a number of 
facets of the parties' relationship which all tend to show 
that this is the sort of thing they would not have eX!-
pressed, but which was, instead, implicit in their dealings. 
For example, they made frequent visits over long dis-
tances with ·each other; they exchanged gifts; they stayed 
at each other's homes; they were blood relatives; plaintiff 
placed large sums of money in defendants' hands for 
certain purposes; defendants drove plaintiff and her 
invalid husband to Layton from Port Angeles, Washing-
ton; plaintiff gave defendant Effie ,~Vhitesides access to 
her safe deposit box; plaintiff made it clear that defend-
ant Effie Whitesides should have plaintiff's property 
when she passed away; and finally, the parties didn't 
bother to p·ut in writing their understandings and agree-
ments, including their agree1nent as to the transaction 
in question. 
Rather, then, than to exp·ect to find an express 
agreement to give a deed, one would expect that the par-
ties simply understood this. It "~as implied' bet,veen them. 
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It is the only reasonable inference in view of their rela-
tionship as above set forth. 
POINT II 
DEFENDAN'TS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 4 WAS 
PROPERLY REFUSED. 
Defendants' requested instruction No.4 is apparently 
based on Section 69 of the Restate1nent of the Law of 
Restitution, but it misquotes the section and distorts the 
n1eaning. That section is found in the portion of the re-
statement which deals with mistake and by its sp·ecific 
provisions, it refers to those situations where mutual mis-
take is an element. The subparagraphs of the section 
show it to be totally inapplicable here, and it was prop:erly 
refused. 
CONCLUSION 
There were numerous conflicts in the evidence pre-
sented to the jury in this case and it was the preroga-
tive of the jurors to believe which of the witnesess they 
chose. Their verdict in favor of the plaintiff is amply 
supported in the evidence and the judgment of the trial 
court based thereon should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
K. ROGER BEAN 
50 North Main Street 
Layton, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent. 
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